Introduction Future HIV vaccine efficacy trials with adolescents will need to ensure that participants comprehend study concepts in order to confer true informed assent. A Hepatitis B vaccine trial with adolescents offers valuable opportunity to test youth understanding of vaccine trial requirements in general. Methods Youth reviewed a simplified assent form with study investigators and then completed a comprehension questionnaire. Once enrolled, all youth were tested for HIV and confirmed to be HIV-negative. Results 123 youth completed the questionnaire (mean age=15 (...) years; 63% male; 70% Hispanic). Overall, only 69 (56%) youth answered all six questions correctly. Conclusions Youth enrolled in a Hepatitis B vaccine trial demonstrated variable comprehension of the study design and various methodological concepts, such as treatment group masking. (shrink)

The following emendations are a selection from adversaria made during repeated readings of Athenaeus. The material to hand during the several perusals has consisted chiefly of Kaibel's recension , the variorum edition of Schweighhauser, and Meineke's Comic Fragments. The editor of the Classical Quarterly has been kind enough to check my suggestions by reference to other material, and I have to thank him for the excision of sundry emendations for which I cannot claim priority. As the full discussion of the (...) several passages here touched upon would require considerable space, I have contented myself with a brevity which is not intended to be in any way dogmatic; but which aims simply at economy of paper and type. I hope at an early date to enter more fully and systematically into the emendation and interpretation of this interesting and instructive writer. (shrink)

I have always found it a sore trial of my faith to regard suam ipsam as = suam dominant, and can only join ipsam with matrem. This leaves suam stand alone, as = suam dominam. That use is doubtless defensible of a wife or mistress in the case of a lover; but it is hardly possible of a sparrow, to whom the lady does not ‘belong’ in that relation. That one who is not lover or husband may know suos is (...) no proof that he may know suum or suam alone. (shrink)

Like everyone else, I was brought up to repeat that regnauit populorum is a ‘Greek genitive = S0009838800023934_inline1’ If one shrinks from depriving examinationpapers of this interesting idiom, he may be consoled by remembering that abstineto irarum and desine querelarum are still left. Why should not populorum depend in a normal manner upon potens ? Surely the sense is improved by the antithesis pauper aquae, potens agrestium populorum. ‘Where Daunus, scant of water, ruled rustic peoples’ contains a somewhat cold pedantry, (...) which is at least partially relieved by the fuller description. I find it difficult to understand why so many scholars prefer to make ex humili potens refer to Horace himself. (shrink)

Like everyone else, I was brought up to repeat that regnauit populorum is a ‘Greek genitive = ’ If one shrinks from depriving examinationpapers of this interesting idiom, he may be consoled by remembering that abstineto irarum and desine querelarum are still left. Why should not populorum depend in a normal manner upon potens? Surely the sense is improved by the antithesis pauper aquae, potens agrestium populorum. ‘Where Daunus, scant of water, ruled rustic peoples’ contains a somewhat cold pedantry, which (...) is at least partially relieved by the fuller description. I find it difficult to understand why so many scholars prefer to make ex humili potens refer to Horace himself. (shrink)

The supposed difficulties of this famous passage are set forth in Conington's notes. In reality they have been created by a misunderstanding, and chiefly through forgetfulness that the English of pauci is ' only a few.' In vv. 743–747 the sense is not that the souls dwell in Elysium ' until lapse of time hath removed the ingrown corruption.' This would surely require donee … exemerit …purumque reliquerit.The fact is that Anchises is explaining his own presence in Elysium at so (...) early a date after his death. If souls require a prolonged purgation before reaching Elysium and the laeta arua, how comes it that he himself is already there? The answer is—because he is one of the few in whose case the process was a short one.Quisque suos patimur Manes, says he, and the length and nature of the purgation depend upon what your Manes deserve and require.?‘ All souls go through such punishment and refining as are necessary.We each suffer our own Manes, and only a few of us are so fortunate as to enjoy the happy fields before a long period has removed the impurities.’ He is himself one of those who have so escaped, and hence his presence here to meet Aeneas so soon after decease. (shrink)

When, in 1974, the authors chose to describe their approach to hospital psychiatry as “rational”, they were departing from the prevailing psychiatric belief that treatment should be based on theories of behavior. Instead, the authors advocated that rational treatments should be based on empirical findings and on pragmatic considerations, a view which a decade later has found its way into mainstream American psychiatry.

Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...) I argue that they do not succeed. (shrink)

The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two (...) ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang’s suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren’t always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism. (shrink)

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, (...) I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification. (shrink)

Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...) that even if Moore does not need Thomson's concept, he still requires the objectionable notion of absolute goodness. I undermine both these replies. I first show that we may dispense with generic goodness without losing Moorean intrinsic goodness. Then, I argue that though intrinsic goodness is indeed a kind of absolute goodness, the objections marshalled against the concept are unsound. (shrink)

The paper explicates unique events and investigates their epistemology. Explications of unique events as individuated, different, and emergent are philosophically uninteresting. Unique events are topics of why-questions that radically underdetermine all their potential explanations. Uniqueness that is relative to a level of scientific development is differentiated from absolute uniqueness. Science eliminates relative uniqueness by discovery of recurrence of events and properties, falsification of assumptions of why-questions, and methodological simplification e.g. by explanatory methodological reduction. Finally, an overview of contemporary philosophical disputes (...) that hinge on issues of uniqueness emphasizes its philosophical significance. (shrink)

I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...) value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology. (shrink)

This chapter explores whether and when experience can be evidence. It argues that experiences can be evidence, and that this claim is compatible with just about any epistemological theory. It evaluates the most promising argument for the conclusion that certain experiences (e.g., seeming to see) are always evidence for believing what the experiences represent. While the argument is very promising, one premise needs further defense. The argument also depends on a certain connection between reasonable belief and the first person perspective.

In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...) but also for people in their daily lives. The right rules for the macro scale of public institutions and policies also apply, with suitable adjustments, to the micro level of individual decision-making. Cohen also charges Rawlsâes constructivism with systematically conflating the concept of justice with other concepts. Within the Rawlsian architectonic, justice is not distinguished either from other values or from optimal rules of social regulation. The elimination of those conflations brings justice closer to equality. (shrink)

This book presents G. A. Cohen's Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. Focusing on Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, Cohen draws a connection between these thought systems and the choices that shape a person's life. In the case of Marxism, the relevant life is his own: a communist upbringing in the 1940s in Montreal, which induced a belief in a strongly socialist egalitarian doctrine. The narrative of Cohen's reckoning with that inheritance develops through a series of sophisticated (...) engagements with the central questions of social and political philosophy. In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, Cohen looks to people's lives in general. He argues that egalitarian justice is not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice. Personal attitude and choice are, moreover, the stuff of which social structure itself is made. Those truths have not informed political philosophy as much as they should, and Cohen's focus on them brings political philosophy closer to moral philosophy, and to the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, than it has recently been. (shrink)

‘No matter what the grievance, and I'm sure that the Palestinians have some legitimate grievances, nothing can justify the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians. If they were attacking our soldiers it would be a different matter.’ (Dr. Zvi Shtauber, Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, BBC Radio 4, May 1, 2003).

In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called ‘Equality of What?’ Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental?

G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. (...) In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as "Equality of What?" and "Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat," along with more recent contributions such as "Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice," "Freedom and Money," and the previously unpublished "How to Do Political Philosophy." On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin. (shrink)

First published in 1978, this book rapidly established itself as a classicof modern Marxism.

We define and study the class of all stack algebras as the class of all minimal algebras in a variety defined by an infinite recursively enumerable set of equations. Among a number of results, we show that the initial model of the variety is computable, that its equational theory is decidable, but that its equational deduction problem is undecidable. We show that it cannot be finitely axiomatised by equations, but it can be finitely axiomatised by equations with a hidden sort (...) and functions. This class of all stack algebras, together with its specifications, can be used to survey the many models in the literature on stacks in a systematic way, and hence give the study of the stack some mathematical coherence. Article Outline. (shrink)